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Management's Liability for Defamation
in Proxy Statements
Morton L. Berg*
T HE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT of 19341 specifically provides for a
dual system of regulation over securities and persons by both state
securities commissions and the SEC, provided that the state authority
does not conflict with the Exchange Act or consequent rules and regu-
lations.2 However, there is no direction given in the Act or its rules as
to whether federal pre-emption will be applied when a Commission rule
attempts to abrogate the state's common law of defamation.
Such an enigma, involving conflicts between federal and state laws
and policies, is presented by two of the proxy rules-Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8. 3
Rule 14a-7 requires that upon written notice from any "security
holder who is entitled to vote," 4 management, at the security holder's
expense, may either promptly supply a reasonably current stock holders
list to the security holder 5 or mail his proxy material to the other stock-
holders.6
Rule 14a-8 (a) permits any security holder entitled to vote to sub-
mit at a meeting proposals to management if they do not apply to elec-
tions to office. Management must, with certain exceptions,
7 include such
proposals in its proxy statement. If management opposes this proposal,
it must also include, at the security holder's request, in management's
proxy statement a security holder's supporting statement defending the
proposal in not more than 100 words.8 Management's reply to the sup-
porting statement may be of any length.
*Ass't. Professor of Law, Univ. of Toledo.
1 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78c-s. (Supp. V, 1963), as amended, 78 Stat. 425 (1964), as amended, 78 Stat. 565
(1964).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1958).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-7, 14a-8 (1964). As to the laws and practices applicable to
proxies generally, see, 3 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, c. 59 (1959, with 1965
suppl.).
4 Rule 14a-7.
5 Rule 14a-7 (c).
6 Rule 14(b) (1). Management's decision whether to supply the list or to mail the
material is at management's option. Smith v. Republic Pictures Corporation, 144
N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup.Ct. 1955).
7 Rule 14a-8 (c) (1)- (5) sets out circumstances, internal in nature, under which
management may omit security holder proposals and supporting statements from its
proxy statement. See, 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 900-912 (2d ed. 1961); Bayne
Caplin, Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Process: The
1954 Amendments, 40 Va. L. Rev. 387 (1954).
8 Rule 14a-8(b).
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Both Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 provide management with a basic dilem-
ma. If management complies with their duties under these two rules,
and the security holder's proxy material, proposal, or 100 word state-
ment contains defamatory material, management and the issuer will be-
come republisher of the defamatory words. It is not necessary that the
defendant, in a defamation action, originate the words. He may be liable
in tort for a republication of defamation published by someone else. All
that is needed is that the republisher communicate the words to some-
one, excluding the Commission, other than the defamed plaintiff.9
Since in most instances there is strict liability for republishing de-
famatory material, 10 management is in the undesirable position of prob-
ably being held liable for defamation without any resort to self-help by
censorship. This is due to the fact that the Commission has the last word
as to whether management must mail, or include in its own proxy state-
ment, security holder proxy material." It is true, under Rule 14a-7,
that management may choose to supply a stock holders list to the secu-
rity holder in lieu of mailing the proxy material. 12 However, manage-
ment would rarely choose this list alternative, since the supplying of it
would put management in the tactical disadvantage of not being able to
examine a security holder's proxy material before it is mailed.13 It is
also true, that management can avoid the inclusion of the security hold-
er's 100 word statement in their proxy material by not opposing the
proposal. 14
To management, such a choice may be inconsistent with their fidu-
ciary duties to the corporation. Management's possible vicarious liability
is not controlled by the de minimis argument. Former SEC Chairman
Armstrong, referring to character impugning through proxy literature
9 Caldwell v. Cromwell-Collier Publ. Co., 161 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947); 3 Restate-
ment, Torts § 578.
10 The tort basis of fault for a republisher of defamatory material, with few excep-
tions not applicable to this situation, is liability without fault, Cobbs v. Chicago De-
fender, 308 Ill. App. 55, 31 N.E. 2d 323 (1941).
It is conceivable, that the person defamed by the security holder's proxy mate-
rial, proposal or 100 word supporting statement will be the corporation or a member
of management. If this situation occurred, the management member would be suing
the issuer and the issuer would be suing management and both would be suing the
security holder.
11 Rule 14a-8. Union Electric Co., 37 SEC 721 (1957), petition for review dismissed
as moot, sub nom., Dyer v. SEC, 251 F. 2d 512 (8th Cir. 1958), vacated, 359 U.S. 499(1959), modified, 361 U.S. 803 (1959), 287 F. 2d 773 (8th Cir. 1961).
Due to the fact that Rule 14a-8 does not apply to election contests, the prob-
abilities of defamatory matter contained in the proposal or the 100 word supporting
statement is reduced. However, Rule 14a-7 includes election contests within itspurview. Election contest proxy material is likely to contain reputation-damaging
words.
12 Supra, note 8.
13 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 892 (2d ed. 1961).
14 Rule 14a-8(b).
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testified that "no aspect of a proxy contest presented a more difficult
problem." 15
The Commission has attempted to solve this management dilemma
by providing in Rule 14a-7 (b) (3), that if management chooses to mail
stock holder proxy statements, "neither the management nor the issuer
shall be responsible for such proxy statements . ," 1. If management
opposes the proposal, and hence comes under a duty to include the 100
word security holder supporting statement in its proxy material,
"neither the management nor the issuer shall be responsible for such
statement." 17
Since no court has interpreted the no responsibility clauses, it can
not be stated with absolute certainty that they will be interpreted as
a Commission attempt to provide management and the issuer with a
defense to defamation actions.' 8 However, since this no responsibility
language appears in the Commission rules, the interpretation by the
Commission should be a conclusive definition of its meaning.19 The Com-
mission has designated the no responsibility clause as an attempt to re-
lieve management from liability and place the sole burden for published
security holder defamatory material on the security holder.2 0 In addi-
tion, if the SEC interpretation is not followed, the question of the man-
agement's and the issuer's federal privilege is not mooted. Since Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8 create a basic unfairness to management and the issuer,
15 3 Stock Market Study, Hearings before Subcom. of Senate Com. on Banking &
Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) 1553-54. Chairman Armstrong, on page 1554
of the same hearing stated that two common schemes of character attack were cur-
rently in use: (1) the device of using artfully worded statements or questions which
discredited by innuendo; and (2) statements appearing in the press and elsewhere
used as reprints in proxy material.
16 Supra, note 3.
17 Rule 14a-8(b), last sentence. It should be noted at this point, possibly due to a
drafting oversight, the "no responsibility" clause in Rule 14a-8(b), does not extend
to the security holder's proposal, but only to the 100 word statement.
18 It is possible that the Commission meant that management should have no crim-
inal liability, or that management should have no responsibility if the SEC brought
an injunction action against them because they complied with their Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 duties and included in their proxy statement, or mailed, security holder ma-
terial which violated Rule 14a-9.
19 Courts will not substitute judgment as to the interpretation the SEC gives to a
rule unless the Commission's interpretation is clearly erroneous. Dyer v. SEC, 290
F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1961), SEC v. Assoc. G. & Electric Co., 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938).
20 Hearings before House Com. on Int. & For. Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and
H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 109-10, 182, 269-70; Armstrong, The SEC and
Proxy Contests, 181 Com. & Fin. Chronicle 1053, Col. 1 (1955). The original idea for
the no responsibility clauses came from the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 312(c),
53 Stat. 1164 (1939), 15 U.S.C. 77 LLL (c) (1958), Congress in § 312(c) provided
immunity to indenture trustees when the trustee circulates bondholder proxy mate-
rial to other bondholders, above House hearings, page 182.
The English Companies Act, has a provision similar to Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8.
The company, on application to the court, may have removed, any defamatory mat-
ter contained in shareholder resolutions, Companies Act, 1948 § 140(S). There has
been no court interpretation of this section through April 1965.
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they may plead the penumbra doctrine in an attempt to infer federal
pre-emption of state law.
The Commission's no responsibility language, contained in Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8, directly poses the question whether these rules, con-
taining an attempt to abrogate a state law of defamation, are to be con-
sidered to have the force and effect of law so as to invoke the "Su-
premacy Clause" of Article VI, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution.
There are no cogent legislative or historical discussions which di-
rectly answer this question.2 1 However, if it can be said the reasons for
adopting Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 serve a valid social purpose, and unless
these proxy rules contain no responsibility clauses, the rules will be un-
fair to management as well as the issuer. Therefore, the first step
toward federal pre-emption of the state law of defamation has been
taken.
Before discussing the substantive law of federal pre-emption, an
investigation into the Commission's manner of dealing with this defa-
mation problem under existing proxy rules will shed some light as to
the magnitude of this problem.
Commission Filing and Review Procedure
Under Rule 14a-6, 22 the security holder's proxy material is re-
viewed by the Commission Staff before it is submitted to management
for mailing. Rule 14a-6 supplies filing requirements for the security
holder's proxy material whereby preliminary and preliminary supple-
mentary proxy material must be furnished to the Commission, for exam-
ination, prior to distribution.23
Under Rule 14a-8, management will be the first to review the pro-
posal and supporting statement. Section (d) of the rule puts the onus
on management, to bring alleged false and defamatory material con-
tained therein to the Commission's attention before management files its
own proxy statement under Rule 14a-6. Management opposition to Rule
21 Rule 14a-8, originally Rule X-14A-7, contained the no responsibility clause from
its inception in 1942, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 3347 (1942). Rule 14a-7, originally Rule LA6 Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 378 (class A) (1935), did not adopt the no responsibility lan-
guage until 1952, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 4775 (1952).
There was no discussion of the no responsibility clauses in Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 in any proxy release, which the writer searched. Releases searched were Sec.
Ex. Act Releases, 378 (Class A) 1935, 2376 (1940), 3347 (1942), 3998 (1947) (pro-
posed), 4037 (1947) adopted, 4114 (1948) (proposed), 4185 (1948) adopted, 4668 (1952)1(proposed), 4775 (1952) (adopted), 4950 (1953) (proposed), 4979 (1953) (adopted),5212 (1955) (proposed), 5276 (1956) (adopted); 29 F.R. 18386 (proposed) (1964),
7508 (1965) (proposed), 7512 (1965) (proposed), and 7566 (1965) (to be effective
7-1-65).
22 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-6 (1964).
23 Rule 14a-6 (a), (b) and (c). Three copies of preliminary proxy material must be
filed with the Commission at least 10 days prior to the definitive communication of
the material. Three copies of preliminary supplementary proxy material must be
filed with the Commission at least 2 days prior to the definitive communication of
the material. Both the 10 day and 2 day periods may be accelerated for good cause.
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14a-8 security holder material takes the form of a memorandum, sup-
ported by an opinion of counsel on the applicable law, as to the reasons
why management feels such a deletion is proper.2 4 This memorandum
is submitted to the Commission. If management fails to notice objection-
able material, the Commission (if it discovers defamatory material
when it examines management's proxy statement containing Rule 14a-8
material under Rule 14a-6) presumably will allow management to op-
pose this at a later time. However, in the Note to Rule 14a-6 the Com-
mission has served fair warning that their review of filed material may
take longer than the time indicated in Rule 14a-6. It is stated that "the
printing of definitive copies for distribution . . . should be deferred until
the comments of the Commission's staff have been received and consid-
ered." 25
Commission examination and review of security holder material,
proposals and supporting statements, is directed to the Staff of the Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance.2 6 This review is on a case by case basis.
27
If the Staff suspects there is false and defamatory material, it will start
informal proceedings in order to determine whether the material is
true.2 8 Letters of comment will be sent to the security holder requesting
supporting data for questionable statements.2 9 Copies of the letters of
comment are also sent to management and are considered confidential
matter. 30 If the security holder can not produce adequate supporting
data to prove the truth of his statements, the Staff will make a deter-
mination of what action to take based on the information obtained.
31
If either management or the security holder do not agree with the
Staff's position regarding inclusion or exclusion of the security holder
material, they can either submit a written statement of their views to
the Commission or they can request to be heard orally by the Com-
mission. The Commission, however, has discretion as to whether to
allow any informal review beyond the Staff level.
32
24 Rule 14a-8 (d). This procedure is based on, 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1964), which sets
down the means whereby a person can bring violations of proxy rules to the Com-
mission's attention.
The Commission will give great weight to this opinion of counsel, Hearings be-
fore House Com. on Int. & For. Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and H.R. 2019,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 118.
25 Note to Rule 14a-6 since the note is worded as should, instead of in the man-
datory sense, would a willful violation be a crime? Could the SEC seek an injunc-
tion for its violation?
26 17 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1964).
27 Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, to the writer (March
5, 1965).
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78U(a) (1958). See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1964).
29 Armstrong, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 181 Com. & Fin. Chronicle 1053, Col. 1
(1955).
30 Supra, note 27.
31 17 C.F.R. § 202.3(a) & 4(a) (1964). Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1462, 69 (1956).
32 Supra, note 47.
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Survey of Rule 14a-9
The Commission's review of Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 proxy material
is within the internal limitations of these rules and is subject to the
further limitation imposed by Rule 14a-9.3 3 Rule 14a-9 provides, in part,
"No solicitation subject to this regulation [Regulation 14.-Solicitation
of Proxies] shall . . . [contain] any statement which, at the time and in
light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact. . .. ," 34 The Note to Rule 14a-9 de-
fines defamatory proxy material as that made without factual founda-
tion.3 5 This is an example of what may be considered by the Commis-
sion as being misleading. 36 Presumably, any false defamatory statement
will be held to be misleading if it is made with respect to any material
fact. The policy behind condemning misleading statements is based on
the assumption that "our economy is best served only if shareholders
have information which is adequate and accurate so that [voter] deci-
sions may be intelligent." 37 Also, misleading statements respecting a
material fact are more likely to sway shareholder votes than a mis-
leading statement respecting opinions on trivial matters. 3 Since by defi-
nition, in Rule 14a-9, an untrue defamatory statement respecting a ma-
terial fact is misleading, scienter does not appear to be an element. 39
Materiality and fact are still at issue, but the definitions of these words
are so broadly construed by the courts that no real interpretive problem
exists. 40 The crucial problem of Rule 14a-9 involves the Commission in
33 Ibid. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-9 (1964).
34 Rule 14 a-9 also states that: "No solicitation ... shall be made by means ...
which omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statements . . .not
false and misleading."
Rule 14a-9 requires that any proxy solicitation which has become false and mis-leading must be corrected in subsequent proxy solicitations. If management be-latedly discovered it had communicated defamatory material through Rules 14a-7
and 14a-8, and plans further solicitations, they could be required by the SEC to
retract these statements under Rule 14a-9, Armstrong, The SEC and Proxy Contests,181 Com. & Fin. Chronicle 1032, Col. 5 (1955). However, although the retraction
may work as a mitigation of damages, the defamatory statement will have been
communicated, hence actionable.
35 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-9, Note (1964). This Note contains four examples laid downby the Commission as to what it regards as may be misleading depending on theparticular facts and circumstances. See, 2 Loss, Securities Regulation, 921-923 (2d
ed. 1961).
36 Rule 14a-9, Note (b).
37 22 SEC Ann. Rep. 36 (1956).
38 The statement must be one which could influence the shareholder's vote. See 2
Loss, Securities Regulation, 917 (2d ed. 1961).
39 Since it is the security holder who creates the defamatory words, scienter on thepart of management would not be involved, unless management knew, or had reasonto know, the words were false and defamatory and did not report this fact to theSEC. In the defamation setting it does not matter if management was as innocent
as a new born baby; if they circulate the defamatory material, they will be held
responsible under the doctrine of strict liability, supra, note 10.
40 An opinion based on inadequate supporting facts is a fact, Ypres Cadillac Mines,
Ltd., 3 SEC 41 (1938). See 3 Loss, Securities Regulation, 1436-1438 (2d ed. 1961).
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determining whether a potentially defamatory statement is or was fac-
tually true at the time, and in light of the circumstances as they exist
or existed, when the statement was made. The burden, as in a common
law defamation action,41 is on the security holder (potential primary
defendant) to support his language to the Staff or the Commission, if
they so request.
4 2
In most cases, falsity is relatively easy to determine.43 There are
borderline cases, however, where either the innuendo is cleverly worded
or the security holder's supporting evidence suggests more than a scin-
tilla of truth.44 The Commission and the courts have made statements
adopting two sets of standards as to the policy of allowing 'puffing' in
proxy material. 45 The difficulty in applying one or the other standard
is that the Commission is attempting to strike a balance among three
policies contained in Rules 14a-7, 14a-8 and 14a-9; (1) inducing share-
holder democracy, 40 (2) allowing inter-shareholder materials to be dis-
tributed, before the meeting, in order that the shareholders will have
time to examine these materials, which should aid them in making a
reasoned voting choice on proposals, 4T and (3) being fair to manage-
ment.48 The Commission cannot hope to exclude all false defamatory
41 In England, defamation is controlled by statute, The English Defamation Act, 15 &
16 Geo. VI and 1 Eliz. II, c. 66, S. 4.
Truth is a universal defense to a defamation action which must be proved by the
defendant, see Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751
(1946).
A minority of states, by statutes or through the common law, require that truth,
in order to be used as a defense, must have been spoken with good motives and
justifiable ends. See cases collected in 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, 1956.
42 Supra, note 29.
43 Supra, note 29, at 1052, Col. 4.
44 Supra, note 15.
45 Judge Rifkind, in SEC v. Okin, 48 F.Supp. 928, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd., 137
F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1943) stated the proxy rules, while they don't allow lying, do
allow liberties with the whole truth. In accord with Judge Rifkind was the Chair-
man of the SEC, Armstrong, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 181 Com. & Fin. Chron-
icle 1032 (1955). Yet, Judge Clark, in SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956)
indicated that the proxy rules were not the same as political contests. He indicated
contestants in proxy contests would not be able to throw misleading statements
about. In accord with the Second Circuit was Chairman Armstrong, 3 Stock Market
Study, Hearings before Subcom. of Senate Com. on Banking & Currency 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1955) 1548.
This seeming dichotomy in wording is designated not too helpful as a "predictive
mechanism," see 2 Loss, Securities Regulation, 920-921 (2d ed. 1961).
46 Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation, 59 Yale L. J. 635, 642 (1950).
47 Ibid. Proxy material violates Rule 14a-9 only if it is misleading at the time at
which it was made. Wouldn't the exclusion of security holder material which later
turned out to be true be just as likely to cause shareholders to make an unreasoned
choice as the inclusion of false and defamatory matter?
48 Hearings before House Com. on Int. & For. Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 and
H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 271.
It would be extremely unfair to management to have the burden of proving as
true, in the defamation action, statements which the security holder made, since
they may have no information concerning the statement.
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statements through their review process 49 or to render, on all occasions,
completely correct opinions as to the truth of proxy statements.50 With
the advent of Sections 12 (g) and 14 (c) 5 1 of the Exchange Act, the Com-
mission's burden in the truth policing of proxy material will greatly
increase. 52 It appears that Rule 14a-9 is one of the proxy rules which
the Commission wishes to amend as part of its tooling up program to
deal with the addition of Section 12 (g) companies to proxy regulation.
The proposal to Rule 14a-9 53 would add, as clause 14a-9 (b)54 the long
standing Commission policy that the Commission's examination of proxy
material is not to be considered a Commission finding that such material
is accurate or complete or not false or misleading, or that the Commis-
sion has passed upon the merits of proxy material.55 Does the proposed
addition to Rule 14a-9 imply that the Commission recognizes that the
'12 (g) companies' will so increase their work load that their previously
excellent scope of review will be hampered?
Is Rule 14a-9 Extra Legal?
There have been attacks against the constitutionality of SEC Rule
14a-9 procedures. The critics contend that the Commission is a censor
and violates the First Amendment in attempting to regulate, through
a fraud rule, the content of proxy material. 56 In the case of SEC v.
May,57 the court summarily dismissed this contention. The Commission
maintains that it does not censor or delete but merely reviews state-
ments in proxy material. It contends that only the federal courts have
49 It has been strongly suggested that the SEC scrutiny of proxy solicitation material
is inadequate, Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors 71 (1957). "Time does not
permit an independent examination of the facts set out in the proxy material and
this results in the Commission accepting the representations . . . at their face value,"
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
50 "The Commission's scrutiny of proxy material does tend to -prevent the use of
misleading facts or to correct them, but it cannot guarantee such results, Arm-
strong, The SEC and Proxy Contests, 181 Com. & Fin. Chronicle 1052, Col. 4 (1955).
But see, "The SEC has been reluctant, as a matter of policy, to initiate litigation
during a proxy fight because the injured party may reply, or seek his own legal
remedy," 3 Stock Market Studies, Hearings before Senate Com. on Banking & Cur-
rency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) 155.
51 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 78 Stat. 569 (1964). It will be of
almost no advantage for a company not to solicit proxies, since under § 14(c), the
company must supply equivalent information, based on the proxy rules, to the SEC
even if it does not solicit.
52 It is estimated that Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act will subject, under the
500 shareholder equity test, 3900 previously unregulated and 15(d) companies to
the proxy rules, Investor Protection, Hearings before Subcom. of House Com. on
Int. & For. Commerce on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, and S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Part 1 (1963) 161.
53 29 F.R. 18386 (1964); Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 7481 (1964).
54 The new clause, if adopted, would be 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-9(b).
55 29 F.R. at 18387 (1964).
56 SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956).
57 Id.
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the power to censor.58 However, since the Commission is able to relieve
management of its duties under Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8, it does have a
powerful ability to censor.5 9 Also, Mr. Justice Black held that Congress
may, without violating the First Amendment, legislate under the com-
merce power to protect the use of the mails from swindles.
60 The test
used to determine whether legislation violates the First Amendment is
whether the harm is greater than the value of the words.6
1 Since one
rationale behind Rule 14a-9 is to keep material which will prevent the
security holders from making a reasoned choice out of their reach, it
would seem that the First Amendment should not protect fraud in the
proxy setting. This assumes the Commission is not using its fraud rule
to censor for censorship sake. Also, the Commission fathered the proxy
rules and should be able to restrict them unless these restrictions destroy
the policies Congress wished to protect.62 However, when the Commis-
sion enjoins false defamatory matter under Rule 14a-9 by not requiring
management to conform to their Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 duties, the Com-
mission not only enjoins false material but also enjoins defamatory
material.
The power of equity to enjoin misleading matter in the securities
field was first recognized in England in the late nineteenth century.
63
Equity courts advance three primary reasons for their reluctance to
enjoin defamation.
First, equity has jurisdiction only to protect property rights, not
personal rights.64 Defamation, except for business defamation, is not an
injury to property rights but an injury to reputation, which is a personal
right.65 This distinction has been severely criticized as not protecting
reputation, which by its nature can never be adequately protected by
58 Supra, note 43.
69 See Union Electric Co., 37 SEC 721 (1957), petition for review dismissed as moot,
sub. nom., Dyer v. SEC, 251 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1958), vacated, 359 U.S. 499 (1959),
modified, 361 U.S. 803 (1959), 287 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1961).
60 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 190-91 (1947). Mr. Justice Black is
known for his strong position favoring the First Amendment, yet when fraud is
involved he allows suppression of speech.
61 Note, *9 Harv. L. Rev. 1462, 1473 (1956).
62 Does the power to create imply the power to limit? It would seem so, especially
where what is created is a privilege such as Rules 14a-7 and 14a- Dyer v. SEC,
290 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1961).
One of the policies of Congress in passing proxy legislation was to, "control the
conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing recur-
rence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders," House Comm. on Int. & For. Commerce, H. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934) 14.
63 The "tricky circular" cases, see Kaye v. Craydon Framways Co. [1898], 1 Ch. 358
(C.A.).
64 Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 Yale L. J. 115 (1923);
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
65 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv.
L. Rev. 640 (1916).
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legal remedies.6 Also, courts allow the enjoining of torts, such as the
right of privacy, which may also be based on defamatory language?
The second objection to enjoining defamation is that to do so would
violate the First Amendment.08 The Commission, when it allows man-
agement to delete security holder proxy material, proposals or 100 word
statements, in effect enjoins defamation of particularly worded phrases
and not prospective defamation. Although injunctions against prospec-
tive defamation tend to be directed toward the total silencing of future
speech,69 an injunction against specific defamatory wording, already in
existence, would be no more objectionable as a restriction of free speech
than defamation sanctions of punitive damages and criminal libel.7 0 The
Commission is not inhibiting speech in a general sense, but is attempting
to delete specific wording, already communicated by the security holder,
which has been adjudged to be beyond the range of constitutional
protection.
7
'
The third argument against enjoining defamation is that juries are
thought to have special competence in deciding issues of falsity. 72 How-
ever, if the security holder disagrees with the Commission's opinion, he
may begin a private action against management to compel them to per-
form their functions under Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8.73 A court would make
the final decision as to falsity, and could impanel a jury to decide the
issue of truth.74
Moreover, the Commission's policy in enforcing Rule 14a-9, is to
prevent fraud and not to enjoin defamation.75 The Commission created
66 Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 943 (1956).
67 Gee v. Pritchard, supra, note 64.
68 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
69 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), held that enjoining allfuture speech of a newspaper because of past defamatory statements violated theFirst Amendment.
The Near Court held that describing an injunction of defamation as a public
nuisance would not have the constitutionality of the defamation statute. On thisreasoning, the Commission's argument that it was only under Rule 14a-9, enjoiningmisleading statements whether or not defamatory would fail. However, Near in-volved an injunction against unknown future defamatory words and not an exact
set of words.
Also, the Commission regulation of false and defamatory material is requiredfor the public interest and should not be frustrated by ancient equity dogma.70 Note, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 1001 (1949). See, Chafee, Free Speech in the United
States 9 (1954).
71 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
72 Supra, note 65, at 655-56.
73 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
74 An equity judge may, under single action statutes, allow a jury to determinequestions of law, Pugh v. Tidewell, 52 N.M. 386, 199 P.2d 1001 (1948). The FederalCourts have adopted the merger of law and equity into a single action statute,Rules of Civil Procedure for United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. (appendix,
Rule 2) (1958).
75 "Commission proxy rules ... are designed to assure that basic facts are disclosedbut leave a wide area for fair comment," Armstrong, The SEC and Proxy Contests,181 Com. & Fin. Chronicle 40, Col. 1 (1955).
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Rules 14a-7 and 14-8 to protect 'shareholder democracy' through in-
creased emphasis on shareholder voting, based on accurate information,
and intra-shareholder communication. Allowing false, defamatory ma-
terial to be included in proxy statements would be tantamount to using
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 as shields for fraud.
7
There has been some suggestion that, as a solution, the Commission
should deal with fraud problems by allowing the private sanction of
reply.7 7 This proposed private sanction could quickly lead to accelerated
chaos and completely frustrate Commission policies favoring accurate
shareholder information. Also, management may have no access to ma-
terials which would disprove false security holder statements.
Enforcement of Rules 14a-7, 14a-8 and 14a-9
Except for the power of suggestion, the Commission in an ordinary
proxy solicitation case has no sanctions it can impose to enforce Rule
14a-9.78 The sanctions are normally imposed by United States district
courts through injunctions applied for by the Commission.79 However,
if the Commission decides that security holder proxy material, proposals
or 100 word statements contain false and defamatory statements, it has a
most effective remedy. The Commission will not require that manage-
ment comply with their Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 duties.8 0 If it determines
that security holder material submitted under Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8
does not violate Rule 14a-9, the Commission will request management
to comply with their duties under Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 .8 Though not
76 Assume that the security holder's proxy material, proposal or 100 word supporting
statement is false and defamatory. If management has another defense available to
it, should the Commission require management to comply with their Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 duties? Not only would this procedure frustrate the Commission's accurate
proxy material policy but it would involve the Commission in playing the role of a
state court judge on a subject in which it is not expertise.
77 This solution was dismissed as not propitious, SEC v. May, supra, note 56. But
see, statement in legislative hearings, footnote 50, supra.
78 Supra, note 43.
79 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21 (e) and (f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 u (e) and (f).
80 Dyer v. S.E.C., 290 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1961). See footnote 11 supra. Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. 3638 (1944).
81 Union Electric Co., 38 SEC 240 (1958), Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 911 (1959).
As a condition precedent to the private action, the security holder should ex-
haust his administrative remedies. This procedure would, at least, involve discus-
sion with the Staff and a request to be heard by the Commission, Peck v. Grey-
hound, 97 F.Supp. 679 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1951).
If the Commission remained silent, and paid no attention to the security holder's
requests to force management to comply with their Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 duties,
this silence should have no effect on the court's decision. However, as Professor
Loss points out, courts have used Commission silence as a basis of decision when
they felt disposed to rule in a particular way, 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 953 (2d
ed. 1961); Dunn v. Decca Records, Inc., 120 F.Supp. 1 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1954). See foot-
note 73 supra.
Management, if requested to comply with their Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 duties by
(Continued on next page)
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likely to do so because of pressures and the fear of bad publicity, man-
agement may disagree with the Commission and refuse to comply with
the Commission's request. Management may then solicit, or threaten to
solicit, their own proxy material, ignoring their duties under Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8.
The Commission, in order to enforce a threatened violation of Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8, may seek a mandatory injunction in a United States
district court to force management compliance.8 2 If management has
begun its solicitation of proxy material, the Commission may seek an
injunction to prevent management from further solicitation and from
using proxies already obtained.8 3
Management's defense to an injunction action would be to allege
the security holder's proxy material, proposal or 100 word statement
violated Rule 14a-9 because it was false and defamatory. The court
would not reverse the Commission unless management could show that
the Commission's action was based on facts so prejudicial to management
as to be considered a gross abuse of discretion. Courts have frequently
stated that the SEC should be the interpreter of their own rules and
policies, unless judicial interference is absolutely necessary.8 4 Although
the court could decide whether the 'no responsibility' clauses of Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8 provide management with a federal privilege to a state
defamation action, it would, in all probability, not do so since courts
are reluctant to construe the Federal Constitution in deciding a case,
unless absolutely necessary.8 5
Private Action
If the Commission relieved management of their duties under Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8 or refused to institute injunction proceedings for threat-
ened or actual management proxy solicitation, the security holder could
begin a private injunction against management, alleging a violation of
Rule 14a-7 and 14a-8.8 6 There would be no written record of the Com-
(Continued from preceding page)
the Commission may also under the authority of 'Borak' begin a private action
against the security holder for injunction alleging a violation of Rule 14a-9. Man-
agement's chances would be slim for the reasons announced on page 22 infra. For
an excellent discussion of the pre-'Borak' law of private actions under the proxy
rules, see, 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 932-973 (2d ed. 1961).
82 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 (f); SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F.Supp.
326, 334 (D. Del. 1946), modified and aff'd. on another issue, 163 F.2d 511 (3rd Cir.1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); Henwood v. SEC, 298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1962).
83 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 (e). Supra, note 82.
84 SEC v. Assoc. G. & Electric Co., 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938).
85 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
86 Supra, note 73. Private actions based on the proxy rules serve as an "effective
weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements," supra at 432 as in any in-junction action, the private party must show clear and convincing evidence, Kauder
v. United Board Corp., 199 F.Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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mission's informal proceedings and comments to security holders or
management. The court could, however obtain reasons for the Com-
mission's refusal to force management to comply with their duties under
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 by either a reported statement of a Staff member,
an SEC memorandum or an SEC brief amicus curiae s T If the Commis-
sion flatly refused to request that management comply with Rules 14a-7
and 14a-8, the security holder has little hope for a court victoryss The
court would defer to the Commission's interpretation of the rules-
absent a gross abuse of discretion-and point out that the security holder
only has a privilege under Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8. 9 The court could also
rely on the fact that the proxy rules, especially Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8,
were instituted by the Commission to promote the security holder's
ability to obtain or provide information necessary for 'corporate de-
mocracy.' The court should not assume, without the strongest proof,
that the Commission is not carrying out its own policies of advancing
security holder's disclosure privileges.
Judicial Review of Commission Action
Section 25(a) of the Exchange Act provides for judicial review, in
a United States Court of Appeals, for any one adversely affected by a
commission order, but only if the order was obtained "in a proceeding
to which such person . . . [was] a party .... ,
The SEC is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's 9' (APA)
judicial review section,92 insofar as Section 25 (a) of the Exchange Act
does not preclude the APA from operating. However, by its wording,
the judicial review section of the APA does not apply to Commission
87 Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev., 1462, 1471 n. 52 (1956). But cf., Peck v. Greyhound, 97
F.Supp. 679 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1951), where the court implied it could not review with-
out an agency record.
88 This event occurred in Union Electric Co., 38 SEC 240 (1958), Dyer v. SEC, 266
F.2d 33 (8th Cir., 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S.
911 (1959).
89 See, SEC v. Assoc. G. & Electric Co., 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938), on the discretion
point; and Dyer v. SEC, 290 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1961) on the privilege point.
90 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (a) p. 401 (1958).
91 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1958).
92 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009 (1958).
The APA, in § 2(d), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d), defines order as, "the whole or any part
of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative . . . in form) of any agency
in any matter other than rule making .... One issue under § 25 of the Exchange
Act is whether the Staff or Commission make an order when they informally deaf
with Rules 14a-7, 14a-8, and 14a-9. Although pre-APA law seemed to indicate
informal decrees of the Commission were not orders, Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944
(1st Cir. 1947), the APA definition of order is now broadly worded, and the law
now seems to be that lack of a formal order will not bar review, Phillips v. SEC, 171
F.2d 180 (2nd Cir. 1948).
APA § 2(g), defines agency proceeding as any agency process including the
order process contained in APA § 2(d).
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determinations under Rules 14a-7, 14a-8 and 14a-9, unless the Commis-
sion permits management or the security holder to be a party.93
Management or the security holder may disagree with the Staff's
interpretation of the Rules and request to be heard by the Commission.
The Commission at its discretion can either deny this request and uphold
the Staff without further hearing, or grant the request and render its
own opinion.
There is no judicial review open to either party where: (1) the
Commission upholds the Staff with or without further proceedings or
(2) reverses the Staff, unless it can be shown the Commission's interpre-
tation of its own rules is clearly erroneous.94 The technical reason for
lack of judicial review is that neither management nor the security
holder are parties, as required under Section 25(a).95 The more cogent
reason is that if a court substituted its judgment for Commission's in-
terpretations of proxy rules, it would be nullifying a discretionary in-
terpretation of the Commission's own rules, presumably made only after
full consideration. 96
Joining the Issues
Management's chances of obtaining relief through court action, from
a Commission determination that management must comply with Rules
93 The SEC's review proceedings, both at the Staff and Commission level, are by
law committed to agency discretion, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 (a), 48
Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78U (a) (1958): See, 17 C.F.R. § 202.5
(1964).
APA § 10, the judicial review section, id., does not apply where, "agency action
is by law committed to agency discretion." The discretionary nature of the SEC's
review procedure of Rules 14a-7, 14a-8 and 14a-9 proxy material removes it from
APA § 10, Leighton v. SEC, 221 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825(1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 905 (1955). However, APA § 10(c) states that
every agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court
shall be subject to judicial review." Professor Davis, in Davis, Nonreviewable
Administrative Action, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 749 (1948), believes, due to the hardships
involved of not having any judicial review of discretionary agency action, that APA§ 10(c) limits APA § 10 to a case where there is an adequate court remedy available
to the person seeking review. Both management and the security holder do have a
private action based on proxy rule violations, J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426(1964), hence are not totally being denied judicial review of Commission action.
94 Curtin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 90659 (civil 91-381,
S.D.N.Y. 1954). Of course, when the reviewing court hears the case as to abuse of
discretion there is a limited form of judicial review.
95 Party is defined, in APA § 2(c), as a person who is allowed to be a party by an
agency or entitled as of right to be a party. The Commission does not allow either
management or the security holder to be admitted as a party under their procedures
of reviewing proxy material, letter of Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.J 90659. Neither management nor the security holder is entitled as of right to be a
party, Peck v. SEC (C.A.2d, Docket 22, 289, 1952), since to deny him party status
does not violate due process, Dyer v. SEC, 290 F.2d 541, 8th Cir. 1961).
The judicial review section of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,§ 24(a), 49 Stat. 834 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79x(a) (1958) does not contain
the party provision. Yet, a Commission refusal to a shareholder's request for a hear-
ing concerning proxy Rule 14a-8 was not subject to judicial review since all that
was involved were privileges granted by the Commission, Dyer v. SEC, supra at 547.
96 Weeks v. Alpert, 131 F.Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1955).
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14a-7 and 14a-8, are almost nonexistent. Because of the time element
involved in any proxy situation, management would most likely accept
a Commission ruling and publish security holder material via Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8. If sued for defamation in a state court, a Commission,
or a federal court ruling that the security holder's material was true
would not bind the state court on the truth issue, under the doctrines
of collateral estoppel or res judicata.97
Section 23 (a)9 8 of the Exchange Act provides immunity for good
faith reliance on a Commission rule, but this section only applies where
a provision of the Exchange Act or rules thereunder imposes liability.
Section 23 (a) says nothing about the situation where the liability is
imposed by state common law.
Even if management can show this good faith reliance on the 'no
responsibility' clauses of Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8, § 23 (a) will provide no
defense to a state defamation action.
99
Section 27100 of the Exchange Act would not provide a bar to a
person bringing a state court defamation action since the alleged wrong
depends on state law and not on a violation of the Exchange Act or
Commission rule. 10 1
The defense of management or the issuer to the state defamation
action would be that the 'no responsibility' clauses in Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 pre-empts the state law of defamation in this narrow area.
The remaining sections of this study will be directed to the sub-
stantive law of federal pre-emption and other federal and state defenses
which may be available to management and the issuer against def-
amation.
Federal Pre-emption
A state's common law rule must yield to a constitutional statute of
Congress. 10 2 A regulation of an administrative agency, made in pur-
suance to a constitutional grant of power by Congress, has the same
force of law as a statute enacted by the Congress.
0 3
97 See 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 1015-1019 (2d ed. 1961). The parties would not
be the same in the state defamation action.
98 48 Stat. 901 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78w(a).
99 For examples of how § 23 (a) was used in connection with Rule 16b-3, see, 3 Loss,
Securities Regulation 1842-1849 (2d ed. 1961).
100 Provides that the federal courts are to have exclusive jurisdiction of the viola-
tions of the Exchange Act or its rules, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa.
101 American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), Pan Am.
Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656, 662 (1961).
The SEC could not enjoin the defamed plaintiff from bringing a state defamation
action, but could file a brief amicus on behalf of the management and/or the issuer.
102 See, Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
103 See, A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471 (1937), rehearing denied, 301 U.S.
712 (1937).
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The application of these two doctrines provides one basis of solution
to the problem of management's 'damned if we do, damned if we don't'
position in relation to Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8.
Invoking federal pre-emption as a solution depends on whether Con-
gress is able to constitutionally abrogate state defamation laws if Rules
14a-7 and 14a-8 were Acts of Congress. If so, what limitations are placed
on the Commission in attempting to do by rule what Congress can do by
statute?
Constitutional Limitations on Congress
The constitutional basis for the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
is found in the commerce power of Congress.104
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, since 1942, have
made it clear that the commerce power is no longer interpreted by de-
termining whether proscribed activities are commerce or interstate in
nature. 0 5
The current test of pre-emption will be invoked if the activity abro-
gated by Congress bears a close relation to interstate commerce so that
its regulation is necessary to protect the policy10 6 announced by the
legislation.
10 7
Valid Congressional legislation under the commerce power has been
universally held to pre-empt conflicting state law. 08 The limitation
placed on Congressional Commerce power is the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 0 9 and the Tenth Amendment will offer no sanc-
tuary to the states."0
104 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 2, 2(1), 2(3), 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 78b (1), 78b (3) (1958). In Mr. Justice Black's opinion the Exchange
Act was passed by Congress, under the commerce power to protect against fraud,
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 190-91 (1947).
105 For an excellent history of the trials and tribulations of the "Commerce Clause"
see, Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 645, 883 (1946). Professor Landis of Harvard Law School in 1932 thought regu-
lation of exchanges would not be based on the commerce power, Hearings before
Committee on Int. & For. Commerce on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.(1934) 237-238, 246-251. See, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
, For a comprehensive presentation of the unorthodox thesis that the commerce
clause, if its meaning were correctly interpreted, empowers Congress to govern all
gainful activity throughout the country, and that the phrase "among the several
states" was never intended to have the meaning "interstate," see, Crosskey, Politics
and the Constitution in the History of the United States (2 Vols. 1953).
106 The legislative policy for proxy rule regulation under the Exchange Act was to
obtain: "power to control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with
a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exer-
cise of the voting rights of shareholders," H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934) 13-14.
107 Carpenter and Mardian, What is Commerce?, 22 So. Cal. L. Rev. 398 (1948). See,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill. (1942).
108 See, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), which is the leading case on the
commerce power.
109 See, Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18 (1944). The commerce power
has been described, "as broad as the economic needs of the nation," American Power
& Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
11o U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-124 (1941).
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The United States Supreme Court has held, in Farmers Union v. W.
Day,"' that Congress may, under the commerce power, and through the
Supremacy Clause, abrogate the state law of defamation.
Farmers Union involved an interpretation of Section 315 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act which provides that a radio or television sta-
tion must give equal time to any legally qualified political candidate
without prior censorship, if the station previously allowed air time to
any one candidate for the same political office.1
2
The defamation suit against the station, arose as a result of a politi-
cal speech pursuant to a request for equal time, in which the candidate
defamed the plaintiff. The entire court held that Section 315 of the
Federal Communications Act gave the station no right to censor political
speech." 3 Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 do not give management the right to
censor security holder proxy material. Commission policy, in Rule
14a-8, determined it would be desirable for management to point out
possible 14a-9 violations as an adjunct to the Commission's policing of
fraud. Yet, the Commission, not management has the final say as to
exclusion. The unfairness is as inherent to management as it was to
the stations in the Farmers Union case. The majority of the Farmers
Union Court felt that station censorship would frustrate the purpose of
the Communications Act favoring full discussion of political views-
since "all remarks even faintly objectionable would be excluded out of
an excess of caution." 114 Rigorous policing of its fraud rule would
negate the Commission's reason for enacting Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8;
which favor full discussion of corporate views involved in corporate
elections and meetings.
The majority of the Farmers Union Court further held that if state
law was not abrogated, its enforcement would either stand as an ob-
stacle to the purposes of Congress or would impose unreasonable and
unfair burdens on radio stations. The majority would not assume that
Congress wanted to be unfair unless it specifically stated so. This result
was reached even though the majority admitted that Congress may not
have intended such an immunity." 5 The basis of the courts reasoning
points to the fact that the FCC, in announcing its Port Huron doctrine,
interpreted Section 315 as granting an immunity." 6 Congress, after the
111 360 U.S. 525 (1959). This case involved a 5 to 4 decision.
112 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. 315(a) (1958). There was no station
censorship of this broadcast, id. at 526.
113 Supra, note 111 at 535.
114 Supra, note 111 at 530.
115 Supra, note 111.
116 A short history of the pre and post Port Huron doctrine will illustrate the need
for uniformity.
Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172 (1927) contained the same
(Continued on next page)
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announcement and with the knowledge of the Port Huron doctrine
amended Section 315 without departing from the FCC's view.117 The
Congress, also with knowledge, of the Commission's 'no responsibility'
policy amended Section 14 of the Exchange Act in 1964 without depart-
ing from the SEC's view. The majority of the Court dismissed the argu-
ment that a station could protect itself from defamation liability by
denying all political candidates air time as being contrary to the pur-
poses of Section 315.118 Management could protect itself from liability
for defamation by never soliciting its own proxies-a practice which
would be contrary to the disclosure principles embodied in the proxy
rules and inconsistent with § 14 (c).
The holding in the Farmers Union case is an example of the
'penumbra' doctrine of interpreting commerce clause legislation. The
Supreme Court inferred federal pre-emption of state law because the
legislation presented an internal dichotomy of announcing a national
regulatory policy which was unfair to the regulated industry.
The majority could not and did not say that the FCC's Port Huron
doctrine had the force and effect of law. 11 9 The Port Huron doctrine
was an interpretation of Congressional legislation, in effect, a constitu-
tional decision which can not bind the Supreme Court. The differences
between what the FCC did in Port Huron and what the Commission is
trying to do in the 'no responsibility' clauses of Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8
may be found in the Congressional enabling acts. Section 315 of the
Communications Act in and of itself makes the policy decision without
(Continued from preceding page)
no censorship, equal time provisions as § 315 of the Federal Communications Act
does. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed sub. nom.
KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) involved, for practical
purposes, the same facts as in Farmers Union. The State Court held that Congress
did not intend a federal privilege because it would raise a question of the Fifth
Amendment. The radio station was held strictly liable for the defamation. In
accord with Sorensen was Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., Inc., 179
Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
The FCC in Port Huron Broadcasting, 12 FCC 1069 (1948), stated, via dicta, that
Section 315 did give a federal privilege. The determination, in Port Huron, was
made in a license renewal hearing in which the station had censored some political
material. The FCC preached that the station should not censor, it had a federal
privilege. The station's license was renewed after the wrist slapping.
The resistance to Port Huron was fierce. The Texas Attorney General, in
Broadcasting, July 5, 1948, P. 50, Col. 4, stated Texas would not follow Port Huron.
Houston Post Co. v. U. S., 79 F.Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948) stated via dicta that the
FCC exceeded their authority in announcing the Port Huron doctrine. Daniel v.
Voice of N. H., Inc., 10 Pike & Fisher Radio Reg. 2045 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1954) also, via
dicta, stated that the FCC was wrong in Port Huron.
However, all was not lost to the FCC for a few state courts agreed with Port
Huron and held that Section 315 created a qualified federal privilege, see Charles
Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
117 In other words, Congress re-enacted the section knowing full well what their
own legislative agency thought of the problem. The Court then used Port Huron as
legislative history.
118 Supra, note 111.
119 Id.
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granting an immunity for defamation. 120 Section 14 of. the Exchange
Act leaves the proxy policy determinations to the Commission under a
broad grant of rule-making power. 121
If the Commission's 'no responsibility' language in Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 has the force and effect of law, there is a stronger argument for
federal pre-emption in the proxy context than in the Communications
Act context, since the 'penumbra' doctrine, or inferring legislative de-
sires, will not be needed to solve the problem.
Delegation of Congressional Authority
In determining whether a Commission rule may invoke federal pre-
emption of a state's common law, the constitutional doctrines of delega-
tion and adequate standards must be examined.
"Congress may and lawfully does delegate legislative power to ad-
ministrative agencies. Delegation by Congress to agencies has long been
recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power
does not become a futility." 122
However, Congress may not delegate any part of its legislative
power to agencies without prescribing a standard.123 The theory of the
standard requirement is that Congress must declare a policy with re-
spect to a subject so that the agency will not act outside its scope of
authority.
The standard set down by Congress in the proxy rule area is con-
tained in Section 14 of the Exchange Act. "[T]he Commission may pre-
scribe [such proxy rules and regulations] as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.... 124
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the 'public interest'
as a valid and adequate Congressional standard. 125
In SEC v. May the court stated that "the Commission's proxy rules
as applied either to management or insurgent stockholder groups are
clearly authorized by statute." 1216
Far from being a brief grant of authority, Section 14 has been in-
terpreted as giving the Commission a carte blanche power with re-
spect to experimentation in the proxy field. One Federal Court has
120 Section 315, in 1959, read: "(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is
a . . .candidate for any public office to use a . . .station, he shall afford equal op-portunities to all . . .other candidiates ... : Provided, . . .the licensee shall have
no power of censorship....
121 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 n, as amended, 78 Stat. 569 (1964).
122 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940). See, 1 Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise §§ 2.01-2.16 (1958).
123 U.S. v. Chicago M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931).
124 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14 (a) and (b).
125 New York Central Securities Corp. v. U.S., 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
126 Supra, note 56 at 124.
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designated the Section 14 language: "as the Commission deems neces-
sary or appropriate" 127 as the conferring by Congress on the Commis-
sion, "legally the broadest content of regulatory and administrative
power possible." 12s The same Court has found Commission power,
under the proxy rules, to be determined by its own judgment as to need
and appropriateness, and not in statutory specification. 129
Professor Davis states:
Sometimes telling the agency to do what is in the public interest is
the practical equivalent of instructing it: Here is the problem. Deal
with it. 13
0
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8-Legislative or Interpretive
A major factor in determining whether the Commission's no re-
sponsibility language has the force of law, and abrogates the state's com-
mon law of defamation is to decide whether Rules 14a-7 and 14 a-8 are
legislative or interpretive rules.13t
The theoretical difference between the two types of rules depends
on whether Congress wishes to equate Commission law making with
their own. With respect to legislative rules, Congress recognizes that
the agency must make policy which should be respected until Congress
decides there is a need for a change. With respect to interpretive rules,
Congress has decided the basic policy and has included this policy in
the statutory language, with the result that the courts are just as able
to interpret the legislation as the agency.
Congress, in enacting Section 14 of the Exchange Act, has made
the decision that the Commission is to be the policy making body with
respect to proxy rules. Not only does Section 14 of the Exchange Act
grant broad rules making powers to the Commission, but Section 14 itself
does not become operative until the Commission legislates by rule.132
The fact that the proxy rules may be used as the basis to invoke the
statutory tort doctrine for private suits indicates they are entitled to
the same weight as Congressional legislation. Also, several courts have
treated the proxy rules as having the force and effect of law. 133
127 Dyer v. SEC, 287 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1961).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise page 82 (1958).
131 Id. at page 298.
132 "There are substantive implementing rules which are legislative and not merely
interpretive in character. [Flor example . . . Exchange Act provisions on solicitation
of proxies were not operative until implemented by Commission rule," Administra-
tive Procedure in Government Agencies, Monograph of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, part 13, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 101.
133 Supra, note 73.
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Legislative rules prescribe what the law shall be, and are entitled
to the same force as Congressional legislation if they are: (1) not ultra
vires, and (2) are within reason. 34
A court, in examining a legislative rule, is free to inquire into
whether the rule is within the power Congress has delegated to the
agency.135
The Congressional policy behind the delegation of proxy rule
making power to the Commission was aptly stated by the Court in SEC
v. Transamerica Corp.:
It was the intent of Congress to require fair opportunity of cor-
porate sufferage. The control of great corporations by a very few
persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting
14 (a).1 36
The Transamerica Court entertained no doubt about the validity of Rule
14a-8.137
In enacting Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 the Commission has attempted to
strengthen corporate sufferage by giving security holders a better chance
to present their material and proposals to other shareholders. Also,
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 have an indirect impact on management in that
the rules tend to keep management from engaging in questionable prac-
tices.138 The Commission has dealt with the democracy problems by
trying to provide an outlet for security holder information which would
be the most economical.
If the Commission feels, in order to provide fairness to management,
and thus avoid management due process contentions, Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 should abrogate the state law of defamation. Congress, and not
the courts, should be the vehicle to change the Commission's views.
Congress, in delegating the proxy rule making power under Section 14
to the Commission, surely delegated the administrative equivalent of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Otherwise, how could the Commis-
sion perform its expertise function in the proxy area without having
to run the legislative gauntlet for every one of its proxy policies?
The courts should not ask, whether the Commission could have in-
stituted their policy through some other means, 139 because this is only
134 Dyer v. SEC, supra, note 81.
135 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
136 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1947).
137 Id. at 518.
1338 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 910 (2 ed. 1961). Especially in the Rule 14a-8 con-
text, since "effective participation by means of [Rule 14a-7] is only rarely possible
because of the large expense," Bayne, Caplin, Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Regu-
lation and the Rule Making Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 Va. L. Rev. 387, 391(1954).
139 Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Ad-
ministrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965).
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for Congress to ask. The court's function is not to determine how well
a rule will work, but to decide whether a given solution has any rea-
soned basis in fact.140
The test of whether a legislative rule is ultra vires should be: if
there is any cogent reason for the rule (fairness to management in the
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 no responsibility clauses) in light of the policy
maker's philosophy the rule is not ultra vires.
The problem of ultra vires acts has bothered commentators on the
FCC's Port Huron doctrine. 14 1 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in
the Farmer's Union case felt that in such an important area, as at-
tempting to abrogate state common law, Congress should make the de-
cision. Justice Frankfurter would have left the question of privilege to
the states, absent Congressional action. 142 This solution does not lend
credence to one important reason for the pre-emption doctrine-that
being uniformity. The advocates of the Congress only doctrine would
fail to take into consideration that Congress, in its broad grant of power
to the Commission under Section 14, has determined that the Commis-
sion is to be the policy making organ in the proxy area.
The reluctance of courts to give full credence to agency enacted
legislative rules is well illustrated by the New York case of Major v.
Waverly & Ogden.143 In the Major case, the plaintiff was injured
during a fall down a stairway. The defendant failed to provide sufficient
lighting or a handrail, which was contrary to a state administrative
agency's legislative rule. The plaintiff tried to rely on the statutory
tort doctrine, which was an available tort theory in New York, but
failed to recover on this theory. The Court held that a violation of an
agency rule could not give rise to the statutory tort doctrine, although
violation of a legislative statute could invoke the doctrine. The Court
went on to say: "a legislative declaration that a rule has the force and
effect of law does not make it so, if by that it is meant that it is the
equivalent of or equal to a legislative enactment." 144 The only cre-
140 "The necessary or appropriate standard in 14(a) lends itself to the interpretation
that Congress intended to grant the SEC the broadest of authority in control of
proxy solicitation and also, any reasonable regulatory scheme," Caplin, Shareholder
Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporation Suffrage, 39 Va. L. Rev.
141, 154 (1953).
141 Supra, note 116.
142 However if Congress doesn't like an agency rule it can and does, short of legisla-
tive reversal, revoke or modify grants of authority and cut appropriations, Mac-
mahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse, 58 Pol.
Sci. A. 161 (1943).
Justice Frankfurter's position, in the Farmers Union Case was, if Congress in-
tended pre-emption they, not the agency, should be the ones to legislate as in Sec-
tion 312(a) of The Trust Indenture Act. However, Justice Frankfurter admitted
that consistent administrative interpretation of pre-emption would have the effect
of law if not ultra vires.
143 7 N.Y.2d 332, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165, 165 N.E.2d 181 (1960).
144 Id. at 336, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 168-69, 165 N.E.2d at 184.
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dence given to the agency rule was that it could be considered as evi-
dence of lack of due care. The court justifies its position by stating that
the New York Constitution requires that the Legislature is to be the
only body capable of enacting any statute.14 5 However, the New York
Constitution does not provide that there can be no delegation of bind-
ing rule making power. The New York Constitution provides: "The
legislative power of this State shall be vested in the Senate and As-
sembly." 1' The wording of the New York Constitution is similar to
the Federal Constitution's declaration of the legislative function, which
requires: "All legislative powers . . . [be] vested in a Congress .... ,, 147
Federal delegation has currently not been delimited by this Constitu-
tional wording. The New York position may be explained by the fact
that state legislatures tend to delegate to lesser officials without ade-
quate safeguards.
The reason for the New York Court's failure to give credence to
agency rules seems to be based on a distrust of agency policy making.
States seem to have fallen into the mistaken supposition that since the
legislature is elected and primarily responsible to the voters, it should
make the laws. The fallacy of this position is that the legislature is
still responsible to the electorate, through initiative and referendum pro-
cedures, for agency appointments. Also, the agency rule making func-
tion is conducted as a miniature democracy in action, especially when
public hearings are held. The 'legislature only' theory tends to waste
valuable legislative time and not make full use of agency expertise.
If the theory behind SEC proxy Rules 14 a- 7 and 14a-8 is not
ultra vires, the Commission should be able to experiment and imple-
ment these rules so as to make them fair to management. This, the
Commission has done via of the no responsibility clauses in the two
rules.
Due Process
The Commission's no responsibility clauses in Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8, are of course, subject to the same constitutional limitations as any
Congressional commerce power legislation. The only constitutional re-
striction imposed on commerce power legislation is that the legislation
must be reasonable; that is, not violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 148
Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Supreme Court, in U. S. v.
145 N. Y. Const. Art. 3, § 1.
146 Id.
147 U. S. Const. Art. I, § 1.
148 Boylan v. U.S., 310 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
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Carolene Products Co.,1"t 9 has supplied the current principles to be used
in determining whether commerce power legislation violates due process.
[T]he existence of facts supporting . . . legislative judgment is to
be presumed, for . . . legislation affecting . . . commercial transac-
tions is not . . . unconstitutional unless in light of the facts . . . it is
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests on
some rationale basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators [Commission] . . . .10 [B]y their . . . nature such in-
quiries . . . must be restricted to the issue whether any state of
facts either known or which could be reasonably assumed afford
support for it. .... 151
Under this doctrine, no Congressional commerce power legislation,
since 1937 has been held to violate due process on the basis of unrea-
sonableness. 152 This test of due process implies (since it is difficult to
imagine any legislative rule for which no rational basis may be found)
that the due process limitation as to economic matters has been removed.
The rational basis for the no responsibility clauses in Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8 is that they are a necessary adjunct to insure fairness to manage-
ment. If Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 did not contain the 'no responsibility'
clauses, management would have a good argument that the rules vio-
late due process, in that they conflict with the fundamental fairness doc-
trines.153
The plaintiff in a defamation action would not be able to success-
fully argue that Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 deprive him of due process since
he would still have his defamation action against the security holder.
A United States District Court, in stating that the commerce
power is more important than the private individual rights of any
one person, held that,
The plaintiff, in order to sustain a claim of due process as against
Commerce Clause legislation, must show a vested right which must
be something more than an anticipated continuance of existing
law. 154
An Eighth Circuit decision has provided language which may be
used as a summary as to the force and effect of the proxy rules by
stating:
149 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
150 Id. at 152.
151 Id. at 154.
152 See, Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1963).
153 "It goes without saying that no court can for a moment entertain the idea that
refraining from doing something which the law forbids can constitute fault and
create civil liabilities or that a person is a free agent when it comes to a choice be-
tween obeying the law and violating it. This is true entirely apart from any question
of incurring a penalty. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 89 F.Supp. 740-742(E.D. Penn. 1950).
154 Hollingsworth v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 74 F.Supp. 1009, 1020 (D.C.
Idaho, 1947).
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This grant of legislative . . . power, in its relation to proxy
solicitation, requires. . . judicial acceptance of any properly adopted
rule . . ., unless it undebatably is unrelated to . . . the policy of
the act or unless it is legally unreasonable.155
It has been shown that the no responsibility clauses of Rules 14a-7
and 14a-8 are part and parcel of valid legislative rules entitled to the
effect of law. These clauses are not ultra vires nor do they violate due
process. Therefore, if these clauses conflict with state defamation law,
the state law should be pre-empted.
Conflict With State Law
Do the 'no responsibility' clauses of Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 sufficiently
conflict with state defamation laws to justify federal pre-emption?
The answer is found in the Farmers Union Case. If the enforce-
ment of a state law would stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes of the objectives of . . . [the Com-
mission], then the state law is in conflict with federal law and must
fall." 1-0 The majority of the Farmers Union Court held that: "Sec-
tion 315 of the Federal Communications Act, if interpreted to allow the
state law of defamation to co-exist with § 315, would be so unfair to
stations that unless Congress, by clear expression, called for such a re-
sult the Court could not." 157 The same unfairness test applies in the
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 context, since management does not have the last
word on whether to include security holder material in its proxy state-
ment or whether to mail security holder material.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Farmers Union case, was
of the view that Section 315 of the Communications Act did not con-
flict with state law. He bases his argument on three reasons: (1) the
states themselves may invoke state or federal privilege; (2) state libel
laws do not prohibit political broadcasts, they just make it less profit-
able; (3) being fair to the stations is being unfair to the defamed
plaintiff. 158 His first reason rejects that uniformity is a desirable ob-
ject of commerce power legislation; his second reason rejects that there
are criminal libel laws; and his third reason rejects that the plaintiff
has a cause of action against the original publisher.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would assume Congress, unless it spe-
cifically stated so, would not want to abrogate defamation law.'5" But
155 Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959),
rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 911 (1959).
156 Supra, note 111 at 535.
15T Ibid.
158 Id. at 535-547.
159 Id. at 541. Coffy v. Midland Broad Co., 8 F.Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934) said the
fact that the station could buy defamation insurance proved that it needed no federal
privilege. This contention was dismissed as without merit in Farmers Union.
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since the 'no responsibility' language of Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 have the
effect of an act of Congress, his test is satisfied.
An Illustrative Case
The case of Free v. Bland'6" can be used as a model of present
Supreme Court thinking in the pre-emption field. In this case, the grant
of federal power came from the Congressional ability to borrow money
on United States credit.'" Yet the commerce power of Congress may
be of a higher priority than the credit borrowing power. The com-
merce power has been equated with the power of Congress to deal with
national security and the national security power has been described
as subject to the paramount authority of Congress. 162
Congress, in the Free case authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
to issue savings bonds in such form and under such conditions as he
may from time to time prescribe. 1 3 The Secretary's power is very
similar to the Commission's proxy power, since the Secretary by rule
can create new forms of savings bonds.
The Secretary issued savings bond regulations providing, in part,
that such bonds issued to co-owners in the 'or' form would be subject to
a federal survivorship provision. The survivorship provision required
that the survivor of the co-owners would be recognized as sole owner
of the bond.164
In Hilley v. Hilley,16 5 a husband and wife with community funds
bought bonds in the 'or' form in Texas, a community property State.
The wife died leaving the bonds to her son by will. The husband, relying
on the Treasury regulation claimed he was owner of the bonds. The
son, relying on Texas community property law, which gives the wife a
vested one-half ownership interest in all property purchased with com-
munity funds, claimed one half of the bonds under the will. The Texas
Supreme Court held with the son's position, stating: "It is clear Fed-
eral regulations do not override local laws in matters of private owner-
ship where the interests of the United States are not involved." 166
The U. S. Supreme Court, invoking federal pre-emption, reversed
the Texas Supreme Court and granted sole ownership of the bonds to
the husband. The Court held that the Treasury regulations were valid
federal law which conflicted with the state law. The Court looked into
160 369 U.S. 663 (1962). It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not
participate in the Free decision.
161 U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.
162 Uliman v. U.S., 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
163 31 U.S.C. § 757(c) (1958).
164 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1958).
165 161 Tex. 569, 577, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
166 Id. at 570.
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the purpose behind the regulation, that of providing a convenient method
of making bonds more attractive to purchasers, and held this reason
to be determinative of the legal issues since the success of debt man-
agement depends, to a large extent, on savings bonds sales. The Su-
preme Court, in the Free case held a determination by a federal agency,
under a sweeping grant of power from Congress, that a particular
sales gimmick may encourage bond purchases, was not ultra vires. 16 7
Implicit in the Supreme Court's opinion is the ability of a federal agency
to undermine the most sacred of state's rights, those being the powers
over forms of property law and wills.
Scope of Federal Pre-Emption
Management, realizing they are operating under the pre-emption
doctrine may want to circulate security holder material which they know
to be false and defamatory if this procedure will serve their own ends.
Should the pre-emption doctrine protect management from liability if
such a situation arises? The answer is supplied by the sequel to the
Free case: Yiatchos v. Yiatchos.16s The husband in Yiatchos purchased
bonds with community property and became the registered owner. He
made a will designating his brothers as the beneficiaries. The Treasury
regulation provided that beneficiaries of bonds were to be the sole own-
ers. There was no evidence that the wife consented to this form of
bond purchase.
In this case, the U. S. Supreme Court held that if the husband's pur-
chase of the bonds could be deemed to be a fraud on the wife's prop-
erty rights, the Treasury Regulations would not pre-empt the state prop-
erty law. 169
The Yiatchos case illustrates that Federal Security Regulations will
not allow management to circulate false proxy material to benefit their
position. If they try to do so, state defamation laws should apply to them.
Due Process and Defamation
Due, perhaps, to the fact that the state law of defamation has little
relation to liability based on fault, the Supreme Court is launching an
effort, through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, to af-
ford defamation defendants more protection from the ravages of state
law. The recent case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan170 illustrates
the renaissance in defamation law. In this case, the plaintiff, an Alabama
public official, had unquestionably be libeled by an advertisement re-
167 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
168 376 U.S. 307 (1964).
169 Id.
170 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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published in the New York Times. The plaintiff made no attempt to
show actual damage but attempted to use the libel per se doctrine in
order to obtain punitive damages. He requested that the Times retract
the material but the Times refused his demand on the ground they
thought the advertisement did not apply to the plaintiff. Under the Ala-
bama law, in order to justify an award for punitive damages, the plain-
tiff had to show malice. The Alabama Courts, relying on the doctrine of
inferred malice, as opposed to actual malice, awarded the plaintiff
$500,000.00.171
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding
that the absence of an Alabama defamation defense which would re-
quire the public official to plead and prove actual malice was a violation
of due process. The Court's reasoning was: "there is a . . . national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be ...
wide open and . . . may include . . . caustic attacks on . . . public of-
ficials." 172 The Court further stated: "The interest of the public . . .
outweighs the interest of any other individual." 173
Although the Times case involved a public official there is an analogy
from the case to the situation where the person defamed by security
holder's Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 proxy material is a member of manage-
ment. Members of management have fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion and to the shareholders. Democracy, corporate or political, re-
quires that the voters have access to information concerning their of-
ficials. It would be a logical extension of the Times doctrine for a court
to hold that when a member of management is defamed, through proxy
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8, he takes on the status of a quasi-public official
and must prove malice in order to recover damages. 174
The Times case left open the question of whether the public official
must prove actual malice if he could establish actual damages as a re-
sult of the spoken or written defamatory words. The Court could have
gone so far as to extend its doctrine of requiring the defamation plain-
tiff to prove actual malice on the part of the defendant to the situation
where the plaintiff is not a public official. This doctrine, if promulgated
in a square holding, would overturn the entire state defamation concept
of liability without fault. The Court stated: "What a State may not
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel." 115 State criminal libel laws
171 Id.
172 Id. at 270.
173 Id. at 282.
174 The case of Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F.Supp. 231, extends the Times doc-
trine to include the 'public man' as well as the 'public official.' The definition of a
'public man' includes a person of political prominence, who could have reasonably
foreseen that his presence would be noticed by news media.
175 Supra, note 170, at 277. It is interesting to note the Times Court, at this point in
the opinion, cited the Farmers Union case as a footnote to the body of the decision.
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require proof of malice. Therefore, lack of actual malice is a required
plaintiff's element to be proved in civil defamation. The Court pointed
out that civil libel laws may have a more inhibiting effect on speech
than criminal libel laws, due to the high damage awards; and the crimi-
nal law has certain constitutional safeguards not available to a civil de-
fendant. 176 The wording of the Times case may even change the basis
of the state law of torts. The Times case implies that where the de-
fendant's conduct may invoke both criminal and civil liability (especial-
ly if the conduct may be the basis of high civil damages and pertains
to areas in which there are constitutional guarantees) the elements of
the tort must be the same as those of the crime. The Court is worried
about the possibility of states using the civil law in an attempt to be
rid of recently promulgated criminal procedural due process require-
ments.
Survey of State Law of Defamation
Republication Doctrine-The majority of states follow the rule that
"every publication or republication of defamatory material is a separate
tort for which the republisher is liable .... ,, 177
The republisher's tort liability is based on the premise that the risk
of harm to reputation and society is especially great in defamation.17 s
Thus, it is of no avail for republishers, except secondary disseminators
such as news vendors, bookstores or libraries,179 to allege that they
could not, assuming they used due care, have located or recognized the
defamatory words. The strict liability rule is relaxed in the case of
secondary disseminators because they have no real opportunity to ex-
amine the vast amount of printed matter they deal with. In the tele-
graph situation, a Federal Circuit Court has held that Congress has
pre-empted the state law of defamation which imposed the strict liability
basis.18s Prior to the Farmers Union case the states were split as to
whether the Federal Communications Act provided a state privilege
to radio and television stations. In fact, some state statutes which gave
176 Ibid.
177 Heller v. Bianco, 111 Co. App.2d 424, 244 P.2d 757 (1952). 1 Harper & James, the
Law of Torts § 518, p. 402 (1956).
See, Painter, Republication Problems in the Law of Defamation, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1131(1961).
178 Lubore v. Pittsburgh Courier Co., 200 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
179 Ayako Sakam v. Zellerbach Paper, 25 Cal. App.2d 309, 77 P.2d 313 (1938).
180 The telegraph situation was another instance where, before federal pre-emption
was invoked, the states were split as to whether the telegraph companies had any
privilege for defamatory sender material. No privilege, Peterson v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18, 67 N.W. 646 (1896); qualified privilege, see, Grisham v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 238 Mo. 480, 142 S.W. 271 (1911). Based on unfairness and a federal
statute which made telegraph companies common carriers a Federal Court invoked
the penumbra doctrine and gave telegraph companies a federal privilege, O'Brian v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940).
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radio stations immunity were struck down in state courts as violative
of the state and federal equal protection clauses.18 1
State Qualified Privileges-In addition to truth and several abso-
lute privileges, 182 not important in the proxy context, there are rec-
ognized state qualified privileges which may give management some
protection if federal pre-emption is not invoked. All qualified privileges
require that the defendant prove absence of malice as a condition to
their use.183
The theory in support of the use of a qualified privilege is that
when the social advantage of the defendant's words tend to outweigh
the harm to the plaintiff, the defendant should be granted a privilege,
unless he acts without the public interest in mind.
8 4
Some states have adopted a qualified privilege referring to the in-
terests of a third person or the public.'l 8 Under this privilege, com-
munications from one shareholder to another' s c or from the corpora-
tion to the shareholders 1 7 relating to business matters have been held
qualifiedly privileged. The difficulties with this privilege are, that not
all states allow the privilege and the communications must relate to some
aspect of the plaintiff's business conduct.' 88
If the defamed plaintiff is a member of management, a person
whose performance is held up to shareholder approval, the qualified
privilege of 'fair comment' i19 may be available to the corporation and
other members of management for defamatory words circulated through
Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8.
This privilege only protects against false statements of opinion.190
This distinction between opinion and fact involves courts in unreason-
able distinctions between fact and opinion and opinion based on fact,
and involves variations too fine for the human mind to comprehend.
Further, this privilege does not extend to situations where the defama-
tion unreasonably concerns the plaintiff's private life.19 '
181 Because the privilege was not accorded to other news media such as newspapers,
Werner v. So. Calif. Ass'n. of Newspapers, 35 Cal.2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
182 For defamatory words spoken in judicial, legislative and administrative proceed-
ings. This absolute privilege in administrative proceedings protects management
from liability when the SEC reviews management proxy statements under Rule
14a-6, which contains security holder Rule 14a-8 proxy material. See 1 Harper &
James, the Law of Torts §§ 5.22, 5.23, 5.24 (1956).
183 Id., Harper & James at §§ 5.25, 5.27.
184 Id. at § 5.25.
185 3 Restatement, Torts § 596.
186 Baker v. Clark, 186 Ky. 816, 218 S.W. 280 (1920).
187 Garey v. Jackson, 197 Mo. App. 217, 193 S.W. 920 (1917).
188 Odgers, Slander and Libel, 231 (6th ed. 1929).
189 Supra, note 185, § 606.
190 Nevada State Journal Pub. Co. v. Henderson, 294 F. 60 (9th Cir. 1920).
191 Supra, note 189.
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DEFAMATION IN PROXY STATEMENTS
The evils connected with the reliance on state privileges are: (1)
lack of uniformity among the states as to whether a privilege exists;
(2) suppression of SEC ability to determine whether Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8, in fact, promote 'shareholder democracy'; and (3) a basic un-
fairness to management which may violate its due process guarantees.
Conclusion
Invoking federal pre-emption to abrogate the state law of defama-
tion, in the context of Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8, may be a Pyrrhic victory
for protagonists of a centralized power structure.
The Commission could have solved the problem of inter-shareholder
communications by requiring the corporation to pay for distribution of
security holder proxy material and proposals. This solution would not
raise any defamation issues since management would not be required to
republish security holder material. But, the Commission's present
method of dealing with a problem involving national policies should not
be abandoned because the solution, as to which segment of the economic
community will bear the risk of unfairness, inherent in Rules 14a-7 and
14a-8, fails to favor a state protected tort right rather than a regulated
enterprise.
The Commission, even though pre-emption is available, should not
abandon their rigorous fraud policing under Rule 14a-9. Commission
review of proxy material, under Rule 14a-9, is undoubtedly the rea-
son Rules 14a-7 and 14a-8 have never been involved in a state defama-
tion action. Pre-emption should be saved for the situations where the
Commission feels the security holder's information is of enough value
to be circulated to fellow shareholders even if the information is of
questionable truth, and to the instance where neither the Commission
nor management recognizes any wording as being defamatory.
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